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PIPE DREAMS: WATER, DEVELOPMENT AND THE WORK OF THE 
IMAGINATION IN ETHIOPIA’S LOWER OMO VALLEY 
David-Paul Pertaub and Edward G.J. Stevenson 
 
ABSTRACT 
Ethiopia’s lower Omo valley is currently undergoing profound changes, due in part to 
water development interventions. The state and corporate partners are implementing 
large dam and irrigation schemes; missionaries are attempting to install safe water 
supplies. We explore the reception of these projects by local people, and their 
implications for intergroup relations. Water development schemes, we argue, function 
as technologies of the imagination, stimulating people to imagine different kinds of 
futures. These dynamics are illustrated through ethnographic work on the reception of 
new wells drilled by European missionaries in Nyangatom. 
KEYWORDS: Ethiopia, Omo valley, water, development, imagination, pastoralism 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the world’s drylands, dreams of the future often involve water being used to 
transform the landscape. In Ethiopia, government officials and planners see the 
drylands as a wilderness waiting to be improved by dams and canals, enabling 
electricity production and irrigated plantation agriculture. Non-governmental 
organisations and missionaries, meanwhile, promote water improvement projects as 
solutions for alleviating poverty, promoting gender equality and reducing infant 
mortality. And in cattle camps and scattered settlements, people who call the drylands 
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home dream of green pastures and consult their seers to find future waters. In this 
article, we consider these visions of water-centred development as ‘technologies of 
the imagination’ (Bear 2015; Sneath et al. 2009). In this usage, the term ‘technology’ 
includes not only material infrastructure but also social practices and processes. Water 
is especially stimulating for the imagination for two reasons: because it is a limiting 
factor for the survival and flourishing of humans, plants and animals; and because the 
means of accessing it are so intimately connected to definitions of community and 
ways of life. 
In the literature on development in Ethiopia, one particular kind of 
imaginative project – the one described by J.C. Scott (1998) as high modernism – has 
received a great deal of attention (e.g. Abbink 2012; Girke 2013; Mosley and Watson 
2016; Turton 2005). While the dam and canal schemes that are currently being used to 
remake Ethiopia’s lower Omo valley clearly invite comparison with the mega-
projects analysed by Scott, a focus on the state’s viewpoint has the unhappy effect of 
excluding other, equally important interpretations. The analytic of technologies of the 
imagination opens up consideration of how water projects fit into other kinds of 
futures, including those of local people and missionaries.  
This article draws on research conducted in the lower Omo valley between 
2012 and 2018. In particular, it stems from work in collaboration with a mission 
station established in Ere in 2013.1 For six weeks in May and June 2016, one of the 
authors (Pertaub) was based in the mission and participated in its daily routines. Two 
research assistants, fluent in Nyangatom and English, provided their services as 
interpreters in interviews with male elders from the settlement, both individually and 
in small groups; small group interviews were also conducted with women.2 The data 
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from this research were supplemented by a further visit to the region in July and 
August 2018. 
After introducing the Nyangatom, their territory and livelihoods, we explore 
some of the visions of water and development that contend for attention in the lower 
Omo. First we consider the perspective of a small community of foreign missionaries 
as they attempt to mobilise local contributions for a new source of drinking water 
alongside their mission station in Nyangatom. Second, we review the larger political- 
economic context within which these local projects are nested, namely the designs of 
the Ethiopian state, which is seeking to impose a new economic order and new 
definitions of community on the peoples of the lower Omo. Third, we explore how 
members of the Nyangatom community are responding to these development 
schemes, and the kinds of futures they imagine for themselves. Finally, we consider 
the ways these various initiatives relate to each other, and the implications of thinking 
of them as technologies of the imagination. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
The heartland of the Nyangatom lies in the lower Omo valley, in the extreme south-
west of Ethiopia. The Nyangatom language is related to that of the Turkana in Kenya, 
the Toposa in South Sudan and both the Jie and Dodoth in Uganda (the Ateker and 
Karamajong clusters; Gulliver 1952). Like many of the peoples of this area, the 
primary identity of Nyanagatom is determined not only by language but also by 
cultural practices associated with the governance of natural resources in specific 
locales (Bassi 2011).3 Nyanagatom livelihoods revolve around mobile pastoralism 
and agriculture, which they practise on the lower reaches of the Omo river as it 
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meanders towards Lake Turkana and on the banks of the seasonal Kibish river to the 
west of the Omo (Alvarsson et al. 1989; Gebre 2014; Tornay 1982, 2001).  
Settlements in the Kibish plain, including Ere, the field site of this study, have 
traditionally served as semi-permanent base camps from which families coordinate 
the seasonal migrations of their herds. Though specialising in mobile pastoralism, 
Nyangatom livelihood activities vary according to the season, and around Kibish they 
include agriculture and hunting and gathering. On the banks of the Omo, by contrast, 
settlements observe a different seasonal calendar reflecting their specialism in 
agriculture. On the floodplains either side of the Omo and in clearings inside the 
meanders, flood-retreat agriculture makes possible multiple harvests of sorghum and 
maize per year, providing valuable calories at the height of the dry season.4  
The principal political unit of relevance to the governance of natural resources 
in Nyangatom is the territorial section, ekitala, a corporate group within which access 
to water and pasture is mediated by the ritual and political leaders of the section, of 
which the emuron (diviner or ritual expert) is the most important (Alvarsson et al. 
1989; Tornay 1982, 1998, 2001).5 Diviners (pl. emurok) have historically served as 
focal points for allegiance and political affiliation, occasionally acting as military 
leaders and mobilising resistance to colonial authorities (Gulliver 1952; Knighton 
2017; Lamphear 1988, 1992).  
From the perspective of the state, the Nyangatom constitute an ethnic group or 
‘nationality’ associated with a specific language and a legally demarcated territory. 
Over the past half century, the Ethiopian state has devoted increased attention to 
ethnicity as an organising principle in politics (James et al. 2002 Turton 2006). Under 
the imperial and military governments, the lower Omo was administered from Arba 
Minch, with the Nyangatom one of many groups in the heterogeneous province of 
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Gamo-Gofa. Under the post-1994 government, administrative units have increasingly 
reflected linguistic and ethnic divisions, culminating for the Nyangatom in the 
creation of an eponymous district (Nyangatom woreda) in 2006 (Tornay 2009). 
Districts are themselves subdivided into kebeles (‘communities’ in Amharic), the 
most basic unit of local political administration in Ethiopia since the Derg (which 
ruled from 1974 to 1987). In the context of highland Ethiopia, the term is commonly 
translated as ‘peasant association’; in the lowlands, the English term ‘village’ is often 
used by government officials, but in practice, kebeles mostly consist of collections of 
semi-permanent settlements grouped together for administrative convenience. 
Nyangatom district is officially divided into twenty kebeles. Although for the most 
part each kebele is attached to only one territorial section, the term otherwise bears 
only a tenuous connection to local understandings of political geography. 
 The slippage between local understandings of community and territory and 
those recognised by administrators constitutes a challenge for the state’s engagement 
with the Nyangatom, as with other agro-pastoralist peoples. The international borders 
between Ethiopia, Kenya and South Sudan bisect the traditional seasonal and 
migratory range of the Nyangatom, and both the waters of the Kibish and the 
extensive grazing lands on the Kenyan side of the border have become the focus of an 
ongoing conflict between the Nyangatom and Turkana (Tornay 1993). As a result of 
conflict in the late 1980s, large numbers of Nyangatom from the Kibish area settled 
on the slopes of Mount Naita in South Sudan, and have since remained there.6 Even 
within Ethiopia, however, many locations important to the Nyangatom are either on 
the fringes of ‘their’ district, or entirely outside it. Longolomor, a wet-season grazing 
area, now lies inside the Omo National Park, annexed by the state for purposes of 
conservation and tourism. Other parts of Nyangatom territory go unrecognised 
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apparently on grounds of administrative convenience. For example, Tirga, another 
important wet-season grazing area which is difficult to access by road, is not formally 
associated with any of the twenty kebeles. Water infrastructure projects have never 
been implemented in Tirga, although – reflecting different terms of engagement 
among different departments of local government – livestock vaccination campaigns 
occur throughout the year.  
Provision (or at least promises) of reliable water supplies are one of the main 
enticements used to encourage permanent settlement and hence a closer alignment 
with the state’s idea of what communities should look like and how they should 
behave.7 In 2012, four kebeles in Nyangatom were selected for a formal process of 
villagisation, and families were encouraged to settle in planned villages laid out to a 
regular plan (FDRE 2012).8 One of the attractions of resettlement was the provision 
of water piped from the Omo river, via a treatment plant, to taps located in the middle 
of the villages. In other parts of Nyangatom, particularly in pastoralist areas along the 
Kibish, the government relies on a looser package of services to encourage permanent 
settlement, including schools, health posts, food-aid distribution centres and 
veterinary clinics.  
Ere, the field site of this study, is a semi-permanent pastoralist settlement on 
the Kibish plain, belonging to the Flamingo (ngikapung) territorial section; Ere also 
serves as the name for a kebele in the government’s administrative structure. 
Although the climate of the region is often characterised as arid, surface water is 
abundant in Ere during the wet season – roughly from March to June – when the plain 
is dotted with ponds and small lakes, and at the height of the rains the River Kibish 
flows to an inland delta to the south (Alvarsson et al. 1989.9 During the dry season, 
however – roughly from July to January – the only water sources in the area are wells 
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dug by hand in the dry bed of the Kibish. Watering animals at this time of year is a 
lengthy and labour-intensive process that requires careful coordination between herd 
owners, families and stock associates. For domestic use, members of the territorial 
section can claim access from any water source; effectively, however, their ability to 
exercise this right is limited by the distance they need to travel. Particularly in the dry 
season, risk of attack by Turkana makes the collection of water from the Kibish by 
women hazardous. 
During a typical year, cattle would migrate to Tirga as the dry season 
deepened, where they were tended by young adults living in temporary cattle camps, 
and return to Ere during the wet season (Gebre 2014; Tornay 1982, 2001). However, 
in recent years, Ere, together with the other settlements on the plain, has become drier 
(Tröger et al. 2011), and with limited rainfall, the plain seldom provides enough grass 
to sustain herds of cattle even in the wet season. In the recent past, therefore, it has 
been principally the elderly and women with young children who live permanently in 
Ere, and for the majority of the year only small stock – sheep and goats – are kept 
there. It is this community to which missionaries were directed by the local 
administration in 2012, and it was there that they sought to implement a social and 
spiritual experiment with the aid of water technology.  
  
THE VISION OF THE CONGREGATION OF ST JAMES  
 
Missionary activity among the Nyangatom dates back to the Swedish Philadelphia 
Church Mission (SPCM), established in 1971. Water was a major focus of the 
Swedish mission, with the SPCM installing artificial irrigation systems and solar-
powered pumps in the early 1980s (Alvarsson et al. 1989). Although the SPCM left in 
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the mid 2000s, missionary activity in Nyangatom resumed in the early 2010s in the 
guise of the Congregation of St James (CSJ), a Catholic order drawing recruits from 
Europe.10 In Kenya, the CSJ had developed a reputation for its practical ministry 
focused on water infrastructure projects including boreholes, rock dams and earth 
pans. In 2012, two priests from the CSJ approached the Nyangatom district 
administration to ask permission to establish a new mission station in southern 
Ethiopia, and were directed to Ere.  
Water technology was fundamental to the CSJ mission from the start, both in 
terms of the viability of a permanent mission station, and in terms of the missionaries’ 
work to improve the lives of the Nyangatom. The priests dreamt of a self-sufficient 
mission that would showcase sustainable water technology in an arid land, and which 
would embody Christian commitments to the environment and to social justice, as 
affirmed in the papal encyclical, Laudato Sí (Francis 2015). They would begin by 
providing the people of Ere with their first year-round, protected domestic water 
supply, thereby saving women the drudgery of travelling to the Kibish river. Clean 
water would lead to better hygiene, better health and reduced child mortality. A 
central water supply would also increase human security, as it would be safe from the 
threat of attack by the Turkana on the other side of the river. Freed from the time-
consuming duties of water collection, young girls would be able to attend school and 
women would have more time and energy to devote to other activities. All manner of 
positive social changes would follow. 
Another development industry vision, community-based management (CBM), 
influenced the fathers as they brought in drilling equipment from Kenya to assist in 
sinking exploratory boreholes in 2013. For the purposes of this article, the most 
salient aspects of CBM are its insistence on the creation of bounded groups of water 
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users (the ‘community’) centred around the exploitation of a water resource, and the 
idea of making these groups at least partly responsible for the costs of building and 
maintaining the infrastructure, in this case the boreholes. According to this model, the 
sustainability of water projects in the longer term depends upon user groups being 
able to exclude outsiders and levy charges (and fines) on insiders.11  
At Ere the idea of bounded, separate communities of water users was 
emphasised from the outset. Of the two deep boreholes drilled, one was to be a private 
water supply for the new mission station: located inside a thorny perimeter fence and 
powered by a diesel pump, it was set aside for the exclusive use of the missionaries 
and their (mostly foreign) visitors. The other borehole, located in an open field and 
fitted with a hand pump, was designated the ‘community’ well, to serve as a source of 
water for domestic use for the residents of Ere. A local man, whom the missionaries 
referred to as the ‘chief’, was invested with the responsibility of ensuring that the 
source was appropriately managed, and, in keeping with CBM principles, the 
missionaries asked for a contribution of seventy goats in lieu of payment towards the 
cost of the well (a figure derived from their experience in Kenya). The purpose behind 
this payment was to engender a sense of ownership among the locals.12  
The technology – both the physical infrastructure (the boreholes and pumps) 
and the social arrangements associated with them (the segregation of different user 
groups and the request for contributions) – provoked unexpected responses from the 
local population. In 2016, more than two years after the installation of the boreholes, 
only four of the seventy goats had been handed over, and the ‘chief’ – viewed by his 
peers as an emuron or diviner, but without effective powers to extract contributions 
from community members – was evasive about future payments. Despite having a 
dedicated pump of their own, the missionaries noticed that on most mornings a queue 
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of women would form outside the mission gate holding jerry cans, waiting 
expectantly for water from the well inside the perimeter fence of the mission station. 
Some of them seemed uncertain how absolute the prohibition on their using the 
mission’s water was; others were simply unaware of the rules. They almost always 
waited in vain: the missionaries wanted to send a clear signal about usage and 
ownership of the wells. 
Concerned that the locals did not appreciate the efforts that they had made on 
their behalf, the missionaries called a meeting to clear up the misunderstandings. 
Under the shade of the tree where the community traditionally held meetings, the 
locals voiced their discontent. The pump to which they had access frequently broke 
down and, since the borehole was deep, pumping by hand required a great deal of 
effort. The pump’s location was also unfavourable: there were no shade trees nearby, 
so people were exposed to the sun as they pumped, and to get to it some community 
members had to take a significant detour from their usual herding routes.  Denial of 
access to the more conveniently located mission water supply appeared to the women 
to be an arbitrary and unfair rule imposed by the priests. One woman chided the 
missionaries as follows: ‘We gave you the land to settle, we provided shelter and a 
place to stay in our community. We live together and we have to stay together. We 
help you. Why don’t you help us too? When we are thirsty, open your gates and give 
us water!’  
Local people believed that if the missionaries really wanted to be considered 
part of the community, as their Christian rhetoric suggested, then they should take on 
the associated responsibilities – indeed, their responsibilities should be greater than 
others because their resources were far greater. Flexible and reciprocal access rights 
to water were part of an inclusive ideology of sharing that underlies the Nyangatom 
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moral economy.13 Fixed, exclusive water-user groups represented an affront to this 
system.  
As described above, the Nyangatom ethic of shared access to natural resources 
is closely related to the mobility that is so crucial for their livelihoods. It enables 
people and animals to move freely across the landscape to take advantage of spatially 
and temporally variable resources. But the connections between mobility, access to 
resources and cultural and political identity are not immediately visible to outsiders – 
to development practitioners, to missionaries or to state officials. Changes in access to 
water resources, because they are intimately tied to ways of life, can become a key 
site of contestation over the shape of communities and economies, and the relations 
between neighbouring peoples. If establishing a new well could so fundamentally 
affect the daily routines and opportunities of a community (as both the missionaries 
and the locals understood), then altering the tempo of the nearby Omo and digging 
new canals, as the engineers and planners working with the Ethiopian state were 
doing, could usher in still greater changes. 
 
THE GOVERNMENT’S VISION 
 
The government’s vision for the lower Omo valley, as announced by the late prime 
minister Meles Zenawi in 2011, is of a wholesale transformation through capital-
intensive, state-driven mega-projects involving hydro-engineering at the level of the 
river basin (Abbink 2012; Fratkin 2014). The government envisage radically changing 
the Omo valley from a dynamic, disequilibrium system supporting a mosaic of small-
scale livelihood strategies, to what would effectively be a cascade of storage sumps 
that efficiently convert water into electricity or commodities such as sugar. Dams on 
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the upper and middle reaches of the Omo would generate electricity, and also allow 
the river’s flow to be regulated, enabling large-scale irrigation downstream. The 
dispersed settlements of the Nyangatom and their neighbours would be replaced by 
permanent villages. The livelihoods of the inhabitants of these villages would be 
based on irrigated agriculture, and villagers would be fully integrated into the 
Ethiopian state and provided with education, health care and piped drinking water. In 
this vision, local people would abandon pastoralism and become contract farmers for 
the sugar plantations (Kamski 2016a, 2016b). The project would finally enable the 
state to incorporate the lowland periphery, the culmination of more than a century of 
state-building efforts (Markakis 2011).  
The state’s plan is informed and legitimised by narratives and imagery that 
devalue and misrepresent existing agro-pastoralist livelihoods in the lower Omo. Just 
as the missionaries of the CSJ misunderstood the logic of mobility for Nyangatom 
livelihoods, so too in the government’s plans is the rationale of mobility in pastoralist 
systems unrecognised (Girke 2013; Turton 2011). Pastoralists are seen as roaming 
aimlessly; to the extent that their livelihoods are productive they are seen as 
irrationally attached to the maximisation of their herds. Crucially, the fundamental 
importance of flood-retreat agriculture for agro-pastoralist livelihoods across the 
region is consistently overlooked.  
When people in positions of power so misunderstand things, they pose a risk 
to others. In river-basin engineering, the ecological conditions that make possible the 
livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of people may be eliminated by the construction 
of a single dam. So it was that in 2015 the annual flooding of the Omo was ended as 
the reservoir behind the Gibe III dam reached capacity. By the summer of 2016 flood-
retreat harvests had become impossible. In the following seasons, Nyangatom 
 13 
communities located along the banks of the Omo were affected most, because 
settlements here included many families who depended heavily on flood-retreat 
agriculture, and owned relatively few cattle. But the impact was also felt more widely 
among communities on the Kibish plain (including Ere) because some of these used 
to migrate seasonally to the banks of the Omo to share in the harvests from the 
riverbanks.  
Although flood-retreat agriculture was no longer possible in 2016, the 
replacement advertised by the government – irrigated agriculture fed by a network of 
canals – was still not available. Against this backdrop, and increasingly dependent on 
food aid from the government, the Nyangatom were keenly aware of the fragility of 
their economic and environmental position.14 The few mission and NGO initiatives in 
the region were therefore newly important as sources of support. 
 
THE VISIONS OF THE NYANGATOM 
 
The missionaries’ visions had conjured into existence a new water infrastructure at 
Ere; the Ethiopian state and its corporate partners were using hydro-engineering to 
turn the lower Omo as a whole into a kind of industrial park. In both cases, 
connections to powerful international networks had allowed them to assemble the 
resources to act upon their visions. In the context of a changing climate, constraints 
on access to grazing land and the end of the annual flooding of the Omo, the new 
water infrastructures in turn inspired dreams and visions among the Nyangatom of 
Ere. Although there were many ideas in the air, three proposals emerged from the 
community’s conversations, each associated with water projects of a different kind. 
The first, similar to the government’s proposal, was to develop irrigated agriculture 
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using water from the River Omo. The second idea was to use water infrastructure to 
support livestock, facilitating a renewed emphasis on mobile pastoralism. The third 
proposal was to move the base camps of the community from Ere to better watered 
areas near the Tirga plateau as part of an adaptive strategy of migration that their 
forebears had resorted to at critical periods in the past.  
In Ere, one of the main proponents of permanent settlement was Locoro. To 
the missionaries, Locoro was the ‘chief’: head of the kebele council, an intermediary 
between the village elders and external parties.15 To the Nyangatom in Ere, Locoro 
was primarily an emuron, a traditional diviner or seer. His prophesies drew on his 
privileged knowledge and articulated visions around which Nyangatom aspirations for 
the future might coalesce.  
In early June 2016, Locoro presided over a haruspicy, a divination ceremony 
following the sacrifice of a goat. The goat’s intestines were laid out on a bed of acacia 
leaves like a pancake. Around them, a group of elders huddled in a circle. Locoro 
inspected the entrails carefully: he pointed, prodded, rubbed a nodule, lifted a flap of 
fat and probed the arteries below. When he spoke the others listened attentively. ‘The 
rains will fail’, he said, ‘and there will be hunger’. Later Locoro explained the 
rationale for his prediction: 
 
There is no harvest on the Omo any more. People are becoming more and 
more dependent on the government for food and water. That’s why we’re 
asking outsiders like the mission to bring water from the ground. In the future, 
the Nyangatom will have to settle down and change from pastoralism to 
agriculture.  
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Locoro seemed resigned to the prospect of the Nyangatom giving up their 
herds and becoming dependent on the government and other agencies. As kebele 
chairman, he was well informed about the government’s plans for the lower Omo, 
including the Kuraz sugar estates. He had attended government-sponsored workshops 
and experience-sharing events throughout the region. On other occasions he had 
commented on the increasing aridity of the plain around Ere and the difficulty of 
finding pasture and practising rain-fed agriculture, which he attributed to a changing 
climate. Events seemed to be conspiring against the Nyangatom and the life they had 
known. 
Others were more optimistic, but the missionaries’ tendency to negotiate with 
the community via Locoro meant that it was difficult to get a hearing for alternative 
ideas. Interviews conducted by one author (Pertaub) therefore presented an 
opportunity for people to get their ideas to the missionaries without the mediation of 
the emuron. Some of them promoted the more original idea of using a new water 
infrastructure to sustain their pastoralist livelihoods. Reflecting widespread biases 
against pastoralism, no water interventions in the district (whether implemented by 
the government, missionaries or NGOs) had ever been explicitly designed for 
livestock. But digging ponds along the transhumance routes between wet- and dry-
season grazing areas, they pointed out, would allow animals to be watered in the dry 
season, and make it possible to open up previously inaccessible pastures.16  
Another proposal was to migrate from Ere to the north and west, relocating 
their base camps, and some people petitioned the mission for a water infrastructure 
project to support this move. Nakom (the first wife of a senior elder) drew a stark 
contrast between the conditions they used to enjoy in Ere and those they faced now:  
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When I was a child, life was good. There were always cattle here at this time 
of year. Now that’s all changed: it’s too hot and there is no grass. We are 
planning to move; we are all discussing it. Our future isn’t here on the plain – 
it’s in the mountains to the west. We can settle there with our animals. There 
is grass for cattle, and when the Kibish river floods we can cultivate. We will 
have lots of milk and butter. No more baboon food for us! 
 
By ‘baboon food’, Nakom meant the food aid distributed by the government. By 
staying in a place where it was impossible to maintain their herds, she implied, the 
people of Ere were consigning themselves to the status of animals. By moving to a 
new location closer to the Tirga mountains, on the other hand, they could secure a 
more decent way of life. If the mission relocated with them, they could have 
boreholes, ponds and other services there, even if the location was outside the 
government’s established area of operations, and outside the Nyangatom’s officially 
designated territory. 
During the main period of fieldwork in 2016, the community of Ere did not 
reach a consensus regarding these three proposals. Opinions and plans changed 
frequently with incoming news. There was no mobile telephone reception in the area, 
and visitors to Ere were assailed with requests for information as soon as they 
arrived.17 In the afternoons the elders debated under the shade tree, and discussions 
continued long into the night at gatherings in the clearings in the middle of each 
settlement. Some of the news seemed to bear out Locoro’s predictions. Relatives 
living by the Omo reported that the river was not rising; as a result, nobody from Ere 
left to cultivate on the Omo, as they usually did at that time of year. Nor did farming 
in the fields around the settlements offer much hope. The rains, which had begun to 
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nourish the maize and sorghum, had failed at the last moment, and within a week, the 
crops had turned yellow and withered. The food aid distributed through the local 
school became increasingly important, and disputes erupted over who should have 
access to it. In this atmosphere of uncertainty and confusion, water infrastructure 
became a lightning rod for hopes as well as frustrations and fears.  
 
REFLECTIONS 
 
In this article we have explored how water development projects in the lower Omo 
valley feature in the world views of different actors, how they function as 
technologies of the imagination. The projects in question are diverse, ranging from 
the digging of simple ponds, to well-drilling and to gargantuan dam and irrigation 
schemes. Also diverse are the ideological framings that different actors bring to bear 
on these projects, including high modernism, a particular model of Christian 
community and the egalitarian ideals of an agro-pastoralist culture. These ideologies 
are not easily reconciled with each other, yet all imply and depend upon certain 
patterns of resource distribution. The contestation that emerged from the water 
projects we have investigated in Nyangatom therefore relates to broader issues of 
alliance and resistance.  
The first issue concerns the kinds of alliance that can spring up between 
parties with different agendas and visions of the future. While the missionaries saw 
themselves as serving the local community, the projects they pursued made them 
unwitting participants in the government’s project of creating a settled, more easily 
governable population (see Scott 1998). To some observers, this might appear to be a 
‘clumsy solution’ to the problem of community water supply – that is, a solution 
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emerging from collaboration and compromise among groups with contrasting sets of 
values (cf. Verweij et al. 2006). But to many among the Nyangatom, settling 
permanently in a place where their cattle cannot survive is too high a price to pay for 
a new water supply. Doing so would greatly reduce their resilience to surviving future 
political or ecological shocks; it would also mean giving up their identity as a 
people.18  
The second issue concerns the kinds of resistance that may be employed by 
people who are ill-served by development projects (see Oliver-Smith 2010). We 
consider the question of resistance in relation to two features of the mission water 
projects that were most unpopular: the setting aside of one well exclusively for the 
use of the mission (compounded by its furnishing with a diesel pump, which added to 
the impression of unfairness) and the request for contributions. The inequity in the 
provision of water for the mission and for the community loomed largest for the 
women, for whom the inferiority of the hand pump and the denial of water from the 
mission well was a daily affront.19 In this context, the fact that some women waited 
outside the mission compound all day for water could be seen as a form of protest: a 
way of making their feelings visible to the priests.  
The second sticking point was the priests’ request for contributions for the 
community well. The locals’ response to this was informed by a precedent, since the 
Swedish missionaries who preceded the CSJ had never asked the community to make 
any payments towards the well or irrigation initiatives they had sponsored in 
Nyangatom. This influenced local expectations of the missionaries, and no amount of 
talk about the responsible management of resources would therefore convince them of 
the fairness of paying for the well. But withholding contributions was also a strategic 
form of resistance. Non-payment opened up the discussion of alternatives; it could 
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function as a tool for realigning the missionaries’ activities with local priorities. By 
refusing to pay, they might bring the missionaries around either to supporting their 
plan to migrate to Tirga, or to helping create more opportunities for watering their 
livestock along their usual transhumance routes.  
If this was their plan, it seems to have worked. At the time of our return visit 
in 2018, the missionaries had invited engineers from Europe to help create large 
ponds and small rock dams in the mountains south of Tirga, where herds might be 
watered during the dry season. (These projects, the missionaries reported, were more 
difficult to obtain funding for than community wells; they did not fit the standard 
model of water interventions favoured by the development industry.) The district 
administration, meanwhile, had persuaded Chinese contractors to dig ponds alongside 
the road they were building between Kangaten and the site of a sugar factory. These 
developments serve as evidence of the ability of people to wring concessions from 
missionaries and the local administration.  
Unfortunately, the designs of the mega-projects that are being pursued 
alongside these smaller initiatives in the Omo valley are more difficult to change. The 
missionaries and local officials are accessible; higher-level officials and corporate 
executives are not. And whereas the missionaries and local administrators appear to 
be invested in working alongside the Nyangatom in the long term, it is unclear 
whether higher-level officials or the contractors whom they employ identify with the 
locals at all. In a real sense, the planned mega-project is not built with the people of 
the lower Omo in mind, but for others, outside the valley. For the state, the dam and 
plantation schemes send signals about the government’s commitments and its 
potential to deliver to its constituents at the political centre (Verhoeven 2002); they 
shore up the nation as an imagined community (Anderson 1983). As with Egypt’s 
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Toshka scheme, which would involve the creation of a second Nile in Egypt’s 
Western Desert (Bush 2007; Mitchell 2002: 272-303), or the Meroe dam in Sudan 
(Verhoeven 2015), the damming of the Omo and the conversion of the lower reaches 
of the valley into sugar plantations does imaginative work. It suggests a common 
enterprise: the national struggle against poverty, and the taming of the frontier.  
To the Nyangatom and other people of the lower Omo, meanwhile, the 
enterprise looks less like a war against poverty and more like a war against their way 
of life. That the state could end the annual flood of the Omo was previously 
unthinkable; that it should do so and then defer its promises to provide alternative 
livelihoods has strengthened their distrust of the state. In this context, enlisting the 
support of allies – including their kinsmen in South Sudan, the missionaries and the 
few Nyangatom who have positions of influence in the government or in the sugar 
projects – assumes a new urgency. They are fully aware that the struggle to create 
new places, new identities and new ways of life happens on an uneven playing field. 
As the state and its corporate partners muster allies in an attempt to realise their 
visions, the Nyangatom are doing the same.  
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1 Ere is a pseudonym. In the Nyangatom language, ere refers to any semi-permanent 
pastoralist settlement. 
2 The study protocol was reviewed and approved by the Research Ethics Committee at 
University College London. 
3 Since the 1990s, language has been the principal criterion for the identification of 
ethnic groups (formally referred to as nations and nationalities) in Ethiopian law.  
4 Flood-retreat (sometimes referred to as flood-recession) agriculture involves 
planting crops after the inundation of land in a floodplain, capitalising on the water 
and silt deposited by the river. It has historically been a particularly valuable part of 
the livelihood portfolio of the peoples of the lower Omo, as described by Almagor 
(1978), Girke (2013), Matsuda (1996), Tornay (2001) and Turton (1979). 
5 There are seven territorial sections among the Nyangatom, each named after a bird. 
Ere is part of the Flamingo territorial section. 
6 Estimates by the administrators of Nyangatom district put the number of people 
resettled in South Sudan at around 30,000. 
7 Government policy in pastoralist areas favours ‘voluntary sedentarisation’ and 
livelihood diversification away from pastoralism (Nassef and Belayhun 2012). 
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8 The kebeles targeted for villagisation were Ayepa, Napotokoit, Shonkora and 
Napusmuria. 
9 Very short rains sometimes also fall in October, although locals report that this is 
happening increasingly rarely.  
10 CSJ is a pseudonym. 
11 The principles of CBM were first set out in a series of influential World Bank 
reports (Briscoe and Ferranti 1988; Katz and Sara 1997). The emerging paradigm was 
greatly influenced by ‘new institutional economics’, represented by the work of 
Ostrom (1990) and North (1990). CBM principles also inform the design of water 
development initiatives in Ethiopia’s Pastoral Community Development Programme 
(PCDP), funded by the World Bank.  
12 This approach is also common in pastoralist areas of Ethiopia. In their analysis of 
the water development sector in the drylands of Ethiopia, Nassef and Belayhun (2012) 
identify both community contributions and engagement with customary leadership 
institutions as examples of good practice.  
13 For comparison, see contributions to Widlok and Tadesse (2005) on egalitarian 
social systems. 
14 As this article went to press in 2018, the Nyangatom of Ere were still waiting for 
access to irrigation. A canal under construction in connection with the development of 
the Omo-Kuraz Sugar Factory Number 5 would, according to the factory director, 
provide irrigated land for cultivation for any and all Nyangatom who wished to farm. 
The district administration, however, were unable to say when these plots would be 
allocated. Upstream in Salamago district (directly north of Nyangatom), where 
subsistence farming on irrigated plots had been attempted from 2013, extremely small 
allotments (0.25 hectares per household) and difficulty accessing water for irrigation 
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from the sugar corporation had led to increased food insecurity (Stevenson and 
Buffavand 2018). 
15 Personal names used here are pseudonyms. 
16 At the time of the study, herders had to stay close to the Kibish river because wells 
in the river bed were the only dependable sources of water along their transit corridor. 
However, given the proximity of the Turkana on the opposite bank of the river, 
maintaining these wells was both labour intensive and dangerous. 
17 A mobile phone mast in Kopriay kebele became active in June 2016, but none of 
the pastoralists in Ere had a phone. Apart from visitors and returning residents, the 
two-way radio in the police station was the settlement’s only telecommunications 
link.  
18 Fixed, inflexible boundaries around water infrastructure installations pose a serious 
challenge for water development projects among pastoralists more widely. See e.g. 
Schnegg and Bolligg (2016) for a discussion of water-user associations and boreholes 
in Namibia. 
19 Although the missionaries were living very simple lives by comparison with their 
compatriots in Europe, the people of Ere were keenly aware that the priests were 
wealthier than they, and that it was within their power to share more of what they had. 
